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CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (3.1)
REVIEW OF ATTENTION, NOT SELF BY JONARDON GANERI
CARLOS MONTEMAYOR & ABROL FAIRWEATHER
1. OVERVIEW
Jonardon Ganeri’s book is a signal contribution to philosophy. His fluency in
philosophy of mind, epistemology, cognitive science, and classic Indian philosophy,
among other traditions, has been previously highlighted (e.g., Arnold 2008; Brooks
2013; Westerhoff 2013). His recent book Attention, Not Self is a major achievement
that synthesizes Ganeri’s knowledge of philosophy and its history, in a truly intercultural way. Our focus will be on the modular and normative aspects of Ganeri’s
account of attention, highlighting possible areas of development and additions that
would help complete the ambitious project of Attention, Not Self. The main topics we
discuss are the relation between consciousness and attention, the importance of
agency for normative evaluations, and the type of virtue theory that could best
accommodate Ganeri’s proposals, given the cognitive architecture he proposes.
A brief survey of the book suffices to appreciate the scope and ambition of
Attention, Not Self. Ganeri defends a view of the mind in which attention, rather than
the self, takes pride of place. Part I, on the priority of attention, surveys and analyzes
classical sources in Indian philosophy (especially the work of Buddhaghosa) and
compares them with many of the leading contemporary theories in philosophy. Ganeri
argues that findings in cognitive science confirm classical Indian views of the mind.
One of the main claims of this section is that the “agent-causal” self should play no
role in a theory of mind. It remains to be seen if there are costs incurred when
accounting for normative evaluation—an issue we explore below. Part II provides an
attentional account of knowledge, focused on perceptual attention. We analyze how
this attentional account of knowledge addresses issues involving epistemic
normativity. Part III, “the calling of attention”, further explores the psychology of
visual attention, emphasizing the modular architecture of the mind that dispenses with
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the agent-causal self. Part IV, “attention expanded”, introduces several types of
attention, underscoring narrative attention for episodic memory and empathetic
attention. The concluding part V, addresses issues about personal identity. Our focus
here is on Ganeri’s account of normative issues in epistemology.
Ganeri defends a functionalist account of attention, partly based on Anne
Treisman’s notion of a “window of consciousness,” namely the thesis that attention
does not work as a spotlight but rather as an aperture “whose shape, size, and tilt can
be adjusted” (12). This adjustment depends fundamentally on the selective nature of
attention, which works by excluding distractors and enhancing attended features,
facilitating the solution of the binding problem—the binding of features that are
reliably tracked and integrated into percepts, and which cannot be illusory bindings
(114-116). These reliable functions of attention provide the basis for an epistemic
psychology that Ganeri develops in Part II.
Two issues stand out from Ganeri’s approach to core issues in philosophy of
mind: the modularity of mind and the dependence of consciousness on attention.
Ganeri proposes that a functional account of attention can explain the emergence of
consciousness. For instance, in describing Buddhaghosa’s second account of
consciousness, concerning “the causal conditions under which consciousness arises,”
Ganeri explains: “consciousness arises at the end of a series of cognitive activities
[…] each member a condition for the next” (42-43). Ganeri then provides a graphical
depiction that illustrates how this view of consciousness is not only dependent on the
functions of attention, but how it also implies a modular view of the mind (consistent
with the no-self approach). A key question about this commitment to modularity is
whether a modular view of the mind can provide enough agential involvement in
order to justify value judgments. We examine this issue in detail below.
Regarding the dependence of consciousness on attention, it may be problematic
for Ganeri’s account to fully explain how consciousness emerges from the activities
and functions of attention, particularly in the light of traditional objections to
functional accounts of phenomenal consciousness (Nagel 1974; Block 1995;
Chalmers 1996). In addition, because of the dependence of consciousness on
attention, Ganeri is endorsing what is called a “single dissociation view” that states
that consciousness cannot occur in the absence of attention. This view excludes
influential contemporary views of phenomenal consciousness that propose that
consciousness can occur in the absence of attention or that it is somehow “primitive”
and independent from attention (see Montemayor and Haldajian 2015, chapter 3 for
discussion). The central question for Ganeri’s account is, how to address the
traditional objections to functionalism about phenomenal consciousness given his noself, emergentist, and single dissociation commitments?
In epistemology, Ganeri may have considerable contributions to make to the
psychology of knowledge, especially to reliabilist theories of knowledge. Attention,
Not Self could be a welcome correction to the psychology of knowledge if Ganeri’s
account of attention has sufficient explanatory power to replace the psychology of
propositional attitudes in epistemic theorizing. One challenge Ganeri faces is
accounting for the full normativity of knowledge with an epistemic psychology that
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makes no appeal to agents. We have argued that knowledge can be understood as the
virtuous sensitivity and insensitivity of attention (Fairweather and Montemayor 2017),
from a virtue reliabilist perspective. However, these are manifestations of agency on
our account (epistemic achievements must be manifestations of agency on any virtue
theoretic account), so it is not clear that Ganeri’s attention based epistemic
psychology would support an adequate account of epistemic normativity.
2. EPISTEMIC NORMATIVITY AND EPISTEMIC PSYCHOLOGY
The agent-causal hypothesis Ganeri argues against has been a central plank in virtue
theoretic accounts of epistemic normativity and non-lucky epistemic success (to
satisfy Gettier worries). Virtue epistemology is considered an ‘agent based’
perspective in epistemology because of the widely shared view that a true belief must
manifest the cognitive abilities of the agent to count as knowledge. Leading figures
including John Greco (2010), Duncan Pritchard (2012), Ernest Sosa (2015) and Linda
Zagzebski (1996) appeal to the normative properties of epistemic agents to account
for anti-luck conditions on knowledge and the distinctive value knowledge has over a
merely true belief. While there are important differences separating them, each
appeals to epistemic agency, or success that is ‘due to’ the abilities of the agent, to
capture essential desiderata in the theory of knowledge. Virtue epistemology thus
appears to rely on the very thesis Ganeri denies throughout Attention, Not self.
What are the possibilities here? On the one hand, Ganeri appears to directly
challenge the fundamental commitment of the agent based theorizing that has been a
significant force over the last thirty years in epistemology. This suggests that the
attentional turn defended by Ganeri and the agential turn in epistemology are moving
in incompatible directions. On the other hand, current theorizing about epistemic
agency in contemporary analytic epistemology might benefit handsomely by heeding
suggestions and modifications from the psychology of attention, in which case the
attentional turn Ganeri defends is not only compatible with the agential turn in
epistemology, but may be a powerful ally going forward. Just as G. E. M. Anscombe
famously called for improvements in moral psychology to guide normative theorizing
in ethics, Ganeri may have substantial improvements to epistemic psychology for
guiding normative theorizing in epistemology.
Ganeri assumes a broadly reliabilist notion of justification, or at least one that is
compatible with externalism (130-133). Process reliabilism has long been criticized
for its dependence on an impoverished epistemic psychology. Cases of “strange and
fleeting processes”, driving through barn-facade country and Mr. Truetemp show that
epistemic success must occur because of (or in virtue of) the abilities of the epistemic
agent to count as knowledge, not merely because of a process that happens to be
reliable (see Greco 2010 for discussion of the “because of” relation). Virtue
reliabilists like Sosa (2015) and Greco (2010) argue that we must replace the
psychology of mere cognitive processes with a psychology of abilities and
competences to escape the well-established problems facing process reliabilism.
Greco calls the improved view “agent reliabilism” (2010). However, an improved
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epistemic psychology of abilities and competencies brings with it the presumption of
a causally efficacious epistemic agent who is, somehow, in control of the cognitive
process. This is where Ganeri would appear to depart from virtue reliabilist theories
of knowledge, although he defends some form of reliabilism, as noted above.
Does Ganeri have an alternative way to procure the theoretical advantages
claimed by agent based epistemology, or does he deny the value of the claimed
advantages to begin with because they rest on a faulty epistemic psychology? If
Ganeri’s modular psychology of attention can support a form of reliabilism that
delivers the needed improvements to process reliabilism, he would have an interesting
competitor to some leading contemporary accounts of knowledge. This modular
account must explain how in spite of the lack of a causally effective introspective
agent, there is still a minimal type of epistemic agent who controls cognitive
processing through her virtuous abilities and competencies.
We believe that Ganeri’s proposal can be complemented with the virtue reliabilist
approach to epistemic normativity we defend in Knowledge, Dexterity and Attention
(Fairweather and Montemayor 2017). Like Ganeri, we argue that the psychology of
attention is the best psychology for epistemology. However, contra Ganeri, we argue
that a normatively adequate attentionalist epistemic psychology requires a minimal
notion of a causally efficacious agent. We understand the success of the minimal
agent in terms of cognitive dispositions that reliably manifest attention’s insensitivity
to defeaters and distractors and the internal normative force of attentional anchoring
through cognitive constitution and control (Fairweather and Montemayor 2017,
chapters 4-6.)
A middle point between the modularity defended by Ganeri and a robust notion of
self will appeal to a minimal agent that sustains forms of virtuous sensitivity and
insensitivity that operate at different stages of cognitive processing (e.g., conceptual,
inferential, expertise-based). We propose that Ganeri’s account of knowledge and
justification, based on attentional capacities, is best understood in terms of virtue
reliabilism and the presumption of a minimal epistemic agent. This allows for enough
automaticity to exploit the virtues of modularity, and enough agency to account for
epistemic responsibility and other normative evaluations of belief. In this way, the
attentional turn Ganeri defends can be very productive for clarifying the epistemic
psychology that supports normative epistemology.
Finally, we would like to briefly assess similar issues with respect to moral
responsibility. It seems that moral responsibility may require a more robust sense of
self, because moral evaluation seems to depend more fundamentally on explicit
judgment. Here the problem is that if Ganeri chooses to construe the morally relevant
normativity of attention in responsibilist terms, the threat of situationism is more
significant than in epistemology (Fairweather and Montemayor 2017, chapters 1 and
2). This interpretation would also jeopardize the no-self commitments of his view.
Here an option is to adopt a view similar to Iris Murdoch’s (1970), according to
which we must immediately attend to the needs of others, without representing them
in terms of personal evaluations, in order to be morally praiseworthy. Such an
approach is indeed very much in line with various views Ganeri endorses about
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empathetic attention, but its empirical verification is more contested than in
epistemology. This possible asymmetry in the psychological analysis of epistemic
and moral responsibility is another area for further exploration concerning Ganeri’s
important book.
3. QUESTIONS
At the end of this writing, we raise the following engaging questions: (1) How does
Ganeri’s approach address the traditional objections to functionalism about
phenomenal consciousness? (2) What is the contribution of consciousness to
epistemic or moral responsibility? (3) How does the attentional turn he calls for
would impact work in contemporary epistemology? (4) What is the role of agency
and motivation in his theory of attention? (5) Given Ganeri’s emphasis on
dispositions and attention capacities, is a virtue theory the best way for him to
account for epistemic value? (6) Can Ganeri's attentional approach provide an
alternative explanation of the source of epistemic value? (7) Does Ganeri's
attentional approach actually suffice to define a minimal epistemic agent or self, in
which case it is a welcome addition to the epistemic psychology of virtue
epistemology and the normative turn more generally?
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